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Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.
126 S. Ct. 860 (2006)
Simon A. Rodell"
Petitioner manufactures and sells custom-made heavy-duty trucks.'
Respondent and other Volvo dealers bid on sales to specific retail
customers. 2 In preparing bids, Respondent and other dealers routinely ask
Petitioner for wholesale price concessions, which Petitioner grants
selectively.' Respondent sued in district court under § 2 of the Clayton
Act,4 as amended by the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act
(RPA), claiming Petitioner gave competing dealers better wholesale price
concessions than it gave Respondent.6 The jury awarded Respondent

* J.D. expected, 2008, University ofFlorida Levin College of Law; M.B.A. expected, 2008,
University of Florida Warrington College of Business. For my parents and Jessica Mueller-thank
you for your love and support.
1. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860, 866 (2006).
2. Id. Retail customers decide which dealers to request bids from based on "an existing
relationship, geography, reputation, cold calling, and other marketing strategies" implemented by
specific dealers. Id.
3. Id. at 866-67.
4. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2000).
5. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000). The relevant text
of the statute reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or
any Territory thereofor the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other
place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them ....
Id.
6. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. v. Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corp., 374 F.3d 701,704-05 (8th
Cir. 2004). Petitioner's expressed policy was "to provide the same price concession to each dealer
competing for ... the same sale." Volvo Trucks, 126 S. Ct. at 867. However, Respondent claimed
that this policy "was not executed." Id.
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damages of more than $1.3 million,7 trebled under the RPA,8 and
Petitioner appealed9 unsuccessfully. The United States Supreme Court
reversed and HELD that a dealer may recover under the RPA only after
proof of lost sales to a "favored" dealer competing to resell products to the
same retail customer..'
In a capitalist society, competitive markets foster efficiency. 2 In the
early twentieth century, however, unregulated industries became extremely
inefficient as large corporations exploited their market power to undercut
their competitors and create monopolies and trusts.13 Congress passed the
Clayton Act 4 in 1914 to curb predatory pricing by these market-dominant
corporations. 5 The primary goals of the Clayton Act and other antitrust
laws were to limit inefficiencies caused by monopolistic businesses, 6
promote inter-brand competition, 7 and protect consumers from
unreasonably high prices.' To further these goals, Congress passed the
RPA in 1936'9 to curtail monopolistic practices by powerful buyers,
particularly large chain retailers.2"
RPA claims are divided into three classes: primary-, secondary-, and
tertiary-line competitive injury.2' A secondary-line claim requires that:

7. Reeder-Simco, 374 F.3d at 707.
8. Id. Private plaintiffs can recover three times their proven damages related to claims under
the Clayton Act. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000). The Supreme Court did not review
Respondent's award of $513,750 for its claim under the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act. Volvo,
126 S. Ct. at 868 n.2.
9. Reeder-Simco, 374 F.3d at 707.
10. Id. at 718.
11. Volvo Trucks, 126 S. Ct. at 868-70.
12. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak& Daniel F. Spulber, DeregulationandManagedCompetition
in Network Industries, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 117, 119 (1998) (arguing free-market competition
benefits consumers "by enhancing productive efficiency" in previously regulated industries such
as telecommunications).
13. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543 n.6 (1960).
14. Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(2000)).
15. Anheuser-Busch, 363 U.S. at 543.
16. See Bruce D. Abramson, Analyzing AntitrustAnalysis: The Roles ofFactand Economic
Theory in Summary Judgment Adjudication, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 303, 308 (2001).
17. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860, 872 (2006).
18. See Abramson, supra note 16, at 315.
19. Robinson-Patman Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2000)).
20. Volvo Trucks, 126 S. Ct. at 869; Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 75-76
(1979); see also infranote 38 (discussing chain retailers as the primary scapegoats during the Great
Depression).
21. Volvo Trucks, 126 S. Ct. at 870. This Comment focuses solely on secondary-line price
discrimination. Primary-line discrimination includes predatory pricing and other conduct that
injures a discriminating seller's direct competitors. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
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"(1) the relevant.., sales were made in interstate commerce;" 22 (2) the
goods sold were of "like grade and quality;, 23 (3) the defendant
24
"'discriminate[d] in price"' between two purchasers of the same goods;
and (4) the price discrimination injured, destroyed, or prevented
competition to the discriminator's advantage.25
The circuit courts have split over how a claimant can prove the injuryto-competition element and have adopted two distinct approaches.26 Under
the first approach, a court infers injury to competition from proof that a
seller charged competing customers a substantially different price over a
prolonged period. 27 Alternatively, a court may require a detailed market
analysis proving injury to competition.28
Under the first approach, a court infers injury to competition directly
from proof of prolonged price discrimination, essentially merging the last

Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,220-22 (1993). Secondary-line price discrimination includes conduct
that injures competition between a "discriminating seller's customers." Volvo Trucks, 126 S. Ct.
at 870. Tertiary-line price discrimination consists of conduct that injures competition between
customers of a discriminating seller's direct purchasers. Id.
22. Volvo Trucks, 126 S. Ct. at 870. The "interstate commerce" element of a secondary-line
claim was not at issue in this case. Id. However, the jurisdictional "interstate commerce"
requirement is narrower under the RPA than it is under the Sherman Act. See Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1974). The GulfOil Court found that the jurisdictional
requirement of the RPA was not satisfied by a showing that some behavior affected commerce. Id.
at 195. Instead, the Court held that at least one discriminatory transaction must occur in the flow
of interstate commerce to meet the requirements of the RPA. Id.
23. The "like grade and quality" element was also not at issue in the instant case. Volvo
Trucks, 126 S. Ct. at 870. For a discussion of the "like grade and quality" element, see FTC v.
Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 640 (1966) (noting that different "labels do not differentiate products"
under the "like grade and quality" requirement of the RPA).
24. Volvo Trucks, 126 S. Ct. at 870 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000)). The Supreme Court
interpreted discrimination in price to mean simply a price difference between two purchasers.
Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 558 (1990) (citing FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363
U.S. 536, 549 (1960)). In other words, a claimant must show "actual sales at two different prices
to two different" purchasers (also known as the "two purchase requirement"). Reeder-Simco GMC,
Inc. v. Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corp., 374 F.3d 701, 707-08 (8th Cir. 2004).
25. Volvo Trucks, 126 S. Ct. at 870.
26. Compare Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(refusing to infer injury to competition from injury to a competitor where the FTC ignored evidence
that competition was not injured), and Am. Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101, 105-06 (7th Cir. 1963)
(vacating an FTC order because minimal lost profits over a seventeen-day period could not
substantially impact a competitor's ability to compete with its rivals), with Chroma Lighting v.
GTE Prods. Corp., 111 F.3d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the inference of competitive
injury from injury to a competitor cannot be rebutted by showing competition was not harmed), and
J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1535 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that
"evidence of injury to a competitor" established injury to competition).
27. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1948).
28. See Am. Oil Co., 325 F.2d at 104-06 (comparing effect of price reductions on the local
market).
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two elements of an RPA claim.2 9 In FTC v. Morton Salt Co., a
manufacturer granted volume-specific discounts.3" The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) 3 found that the manufacturer's volume discounts
violated the RPA and issued a cease-and-desist order.32 On appeal, the
circuit court vacated the order, holding that the FTC failed to prove the
volume discounts harmed competition.33
The Supreme Court reversed and formulated the "Morton Salt
inference" 34 : The requisite injury to competition could be inferred from
evidence of price discrimination over time.35 The Court's ruling relied
heavily on both the text36 and the legislative history of the RPA.37 The
Court noted that the purpose of the RPA was to prevent injury to
competition before it occurred and to protect smaller businesses.38 The
Court stressed the purportedly "obvious" inference that competitors would
always be injured if they were forced to pay their suppliers higher prices
than their competition over a prolonged period.39
Alternatively, a claimant may be required to present a detailed market
analysis proving a seller's price discrimination injured competition.4 In
29. See Morton Salt, 334 U.S. at 45-47.
30. Id. at 41.
31. The RPA is enforced by three different sources: the Federal Trade Commission, 15
U.S.C. § 21(a) (2000); the Department of Justice, id. § 25; and private litigants, who may seek
treble damages, id. § 15(a), or injunctive relief, id. § 26.
32. Morton Salt, 334 U.S. at 39-40. The manufacturer in Morton Salt charged: $1.60 per case
for less-than-carload purchases; $1.50 per case for carload purchases; $1.40 per case to anyone who
bought 5,000 cases in any consecutive twelve months; and $1.35 per case to anyone who bought
50,000 cases in any consecutive twelve months. Id. at 41. The discounts were available to anyone;
however, only five companies had ever purchased enough salt in any period to get the $1.35 price.
Id.
33. Id. at 40.
34. Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary Line Price Discriminationand the FateofMorton Salt: To
Save It, Let It Go, 48 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1073 (1999).
35. See Morton Salt, 334 U.S. at 50-51.
36. The RPA states that price discrimination is only illegal if it substantially lessens
competition or tends to create a monopoly. See supra note 5. For additional support, the Morton
Salt Court cited Corn ProductsRefining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945), which held that the
RPA only required proof that there was a "reasonable possibility" that the price discriminations
might harm competition. Morton Salt, 334 U.S. at 46 (citing Corn Prods., 324 U.S. at 742).
37. See id. at 43-45.
38. Id. at 49-50. The RPA was passed during the nadir of the Great Depression. Hugh C.
Hansen,Robinson-PatmanLaw: A Review andAnalysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1113, 1120 (1983).
During this period, Congress used radical measures to try and solve the country's problems. Id.
Thus, one view of the RPA is that it was a congressional attempt to save the country (and small
businesses) from a primary scapegoat of the Great Depression: the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Company (and other large chain stores). Id. at 1122-23.
39. Morton Salt, 334 U.S. at 46-47.
40. See Am. Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101, 104-06 (7th Cir. 1963) (analyzing the effect of
price reductions on the local market).
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American Oil Co. v. FTC, an oil company gave greater price concessions
to retailers in a town where competing brands began a price war, but kept
concessions in neighboring towns constant.' As a result, dealers in the
town affected by the price war paid lower prices for gas than dealers in the
neighboring town over a seventeen-day period.42 The FTC found that the
oil company had engaged in price discrimination in violation of the RPA
and issued a cease-and-desist order.43
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the FTC's order,
asserting that, although the oil company's prices during the seventeen-day
period were discriminatory, there was no evidence the discrimination
actually harmed competition.' The court emphasized that the RPA's
primary concern was the preservation of competition and that the statute's
' The court analyzed
concern for individual competitors was "incidental."45
the relevant market and lost profits of the disadvantaged retailers and
determined that their actual economic losses were slight. 6
Minimal economic losses, the court emphasized, could not
substantially impact any rival's ability to compete.4 ' Further, the Seventh
Circuit distinguished Morton Salt, asserting that the inference of
competitive injury from evidence of price discrimination applies only
when a favored buyer enjoys a routine and permanent price advantage over
its rivals. 48 Because the retailer's advantage in American Oil lasted for
only seventeen days and caused minimal lost profits, the court refused to
invoke the Morton Salt inference and reversed the FTC's ruling.49
In the instant case, the Supreme Court used a transaction-specific
market analysis approach to evaluate whether Petitioner's pricing
strategies injured competition between Respondent and its rivals.5"
Respondent presented three types of evidence to prove competitive
injury.5 First, Respondent compared concessions it received on four
successful bids with larger concessions granted to other Volvo dealers who
won bids on different sales (purchase-to-purchase comparisons).52 Second,

41. Id. at 103.
42. Id.
43. Id.at 102.
44. Id.at 106.
45. Id.at 104.
46. Id.at 104-05.
47. Id.at 105. The court also stated that there was no evidence that the lost profits were
attributable to the oil company's pricing strategy and not to the lower prices charged by other
brands in the neighboring area. Id.at 106.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 860, 871 (2006).
51. Id.at 870.
52. Id.at 870-71.
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Respondent compared concessions received from Petitioner in connection
with unsuccessful bids against non-Volvo dealers to greater concessions
offered to other Volvo dealers who successfully bid on different sales
(offer-to-purchase comparisons). 3 Finally, Respondent presented two
comparisons where Respondent and another dealer bid on the same sale
and Respondent lost the bid (head-to-head comparisons). 4
First, the instant Court dismissed both the purchase-to-purchase and
offer-to-purchase comparisons as too "manipulable" to invoke the Morton
Salt inference.55 The instant Court noted that Respondent and other dealers
were not in actual competition even though they competed for the same
customers in a broad geographic area.56 The Court stated that competition
was unaffected by price differences at this stage because dealers
approached Petitioner for price concessions only after the customer
decided which dealers should submit bids. 7 Because the dealers were not
in actual competition, the Court refused to infer competitive injury from
either the purchase-to-purchase or the offer-to-purchase comparisons.5
Next, the instant Court rejected the evidence of Respondent's two
head-to-head comparisons. 9 The Court refused to use the Morton Salt
inference because Respondent's evidence failed to prove a substantial
injury.6 ° Instead, the Court used the market analysis approach, and asserted
that the relevant market for each transaction was limited to the dealers that
submitted bids on each specific sale.61 The Court analyzed each head-tohead transaction and noted that Respondent lost only one sale to a
competing dealer, resulting in a lost profit of $30,000.62 The Court stated
that the loss of one sale could not have significantly affected competition
between Respondent and its rivals. 3 Accordingly, the Supreme Court

53. Id. at 871.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 871, 872.
57. Id. at 871; see also infra note 69.
58. See Volvo Trucks, 126 S. Ct. at 872.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Seeid. at871.
62. Id. at 872. The Court questioned whether Respondent's evidence proved Petitioner
discriminated in price, but the Court reasoned that, even if it assumed that Petitioner discriminated
in price, the minimal harm to Respondent could not have injured competition between Respondent
and the other dealers. Id. In the first head-to-head comparison, Petitioner initially offered both
dealers the same concession, although Petitioner increased the concession given to Respondent's
competing dealer after the other dealer won the bid. Id. In the second head-to-head comparison,
Petitioner increased the concession offered to Respondent to match the concession offered to the
other dealer, although neither dealer won the bid. Id.
63. Id.
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reversed and remanded the case back to the circuit court.'
The instant Court's decision impacts future secondary-line cases in two
ways. First, the instant decision limits manufacturer RPA liability in
competitive bidding situations by confining proof of price discrimination
to head-to-head comparisons. This limitation on manufacturer risk
promotes inter-brand competition while remaining true to the original aim
of the RPA by treating similarly-situated resellers equally." Second, and
more broadly, the Court's adoption of the market analysis approach
foreshadows the end of the Morton Salt inference by focusing on injured
competition instead of injured competitors.
The instant decision significantly confines manufacturers' RPA risk in
competitive bidding situations. Since competitive injury could be inferred
from mere price discrimination under the Morton Salt rule,66 the RPA
encouraged price rigidity by requiring justification for any difference in
price charged to two different resellers.67 For manufacturers wary of RPA
liability, the easiest route was to charge a single price across the board.6"
Under the Court's ruling, however, a court may infer injury to competition
only if a claimant shows it received lower concessions in head-to-head
competition with another reseller.69 Thus, manufacturers' RPA risk is
limited because they are required only to give the same concession to
resellers competing for the same retail sale.
Further, by confining manufacturers' RPA liability to head-to-head
comparisons, the Court's ruling promotes inter-brand competition. Under
the instant decision, a manufacturer may legally set its price for each
specific sale, allowing it to pass on more savings to consumers.
Manufacturers in other industries may now use concession programs, like
the one used by Petitioner, to lower retail prices to the end consumer.

64. Id. at 873.
65. See supranotes 16-18 and accompanying text.
66. See supranotes 27, 34-35 and accompanying text.
67. There are three defenses to a prima facie RPA claim: cost justification, meeting
competition, and changing market conditions. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(b) (2000). The cost justification defense reflects the idea that it is cheaper for a
manufacturer to sell to some buyers than to others and that price differentials based on cost savings
are legitimate. See Hansen, supra note 38, at 1145, 1149. The meeting competition defense
legalizes price differentials made to meet the equally low price of a competitor. Id. at 1149. Finally,
the changing conditions defense allows justification of price differentials based on a change in
market conditions or the marketability of a product. Id. at 1154.
68. See Hansen, supra note 38, at 1190-93.
69. By analyzing each transaction separately under the market analysis approach, the Court
has allowed courts to determine whether competitive injury has occurred on a case-by-case basis.
Analyzing each sale separately is appropriate in competitive bidding situations because dealers are
not in direct competition until they have been selected to bid. See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v.
Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860, 871 (2006). Once dealers have been selected, the relevant
market becomes only those dealers competing for the specific sale. Id. at 871-72.
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Price-conscious consumers will shop around for the lowest possible price,
encouraging manufacturers to compete for each sale and bolstering interbrand competition.
At the same time, the Court's decision remains true to the original aim
of the RPA by ensuring similarly-situated resellers are treated equally.7"
Under the Court's transaction-specific analysis, a manufacturer must give
the same concession to each reseller competing for the same sale.71
However, in situations where the resellers are not competing for the same
sale and are not similarly situated, manufacturers remain free to dictate
their prices. Thus, the instant Court's decision promotes competition by
limiting manufacturers' RPA risk but remains true to the original purpose
of the RPA by treating similarly-situated resellers equally.
Consequently, the instant Court's adoption of the market analysis
approach used in American Oil refocuses the relevant inquiry from injured
competitors to injury to competition in secondary-line cases. The Court
has stated that the RPA "should be interpreted as consistent with the
broader policies of antitrust laws."72 However, the RPA has long been
criticized as anomalous among antitrust laws because it focuses on injured
competitors instead of injured competition." Commentators have pointed
out that this focus yields higher prices,74 promotes price fixing, and
increases the costs of doing business.75 Until now, the Court had ignored
these critiques in secondary-line cases and allowed the Morton Salt
inference to further the RPA's policy of protecting competitors.76
Although the Court's holding is limited to competitive bidding
situations, the Court's statement that inter-brand competition is the
primary concern of antitrust law manifests its desire to end the reign of
Morton Salt.77 The Court's market analysis approach undermines the

70. See Gavil, supranote 34, at 1078-79.
71. See Volvo Trucks, 126 S. Ct. at 872.
72. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993);
see also Automatic Canteen Co. of Am. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953).
73. Paul H. Larue, Robinson-PatmanAct in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Morton Salt
Rule be Retired?, 48 SMUL. REv. 1917, 1917 (1995).
74. Id.
75. See Hansen, supra note 38, at 1188-91.
76. In primary-line cases, however, the Court ruled that it is improper to infer competitive
injury from injury to a competitor. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226. The Brooke Group Court
emphasized that antitrust laws protect competition and not competitors. Id.at 224. Therefore, to
prove injury to competition in primary-line situations, the Court required proof that the predatory
scheme would have the desired effects on its competitors and increase prices above a competitive
level (allowing the predator to recoup its costs incurred from the predatory pricing scheme). Id.at
225-26.
77. See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 860, 872 (2006)
(stating that the Court would resist any interpretation of the RPA "geared more to the protection
of existing competitors than to the stimulation of competition").
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Morton Salt inference because the factfinder must be convinced that the
relevant price discrimination injured competition.78 Thus, the market
analysis approach "unmerges" the third and fourth elements of secondaryline RPA cases: Competitive injury may no longer be inferred directly
from price discrimination over time. The instant case resolves the circuit
split 79 in favor of the market analysis approach and shifts the relevant
inquiry in secondary-line cases from injured competitors to injured
competition. 0
The instant decision demonstrates the Court's commitment to
reconciling the RPA with the policy goals of other antitrust laws. By
ensuring that the inquiry in competitive bidding situations is whether a
manufacturer's price discrimination harmed competition, not a specific
competitor, the instant ruling promotes inter-brand competition.81 At the
same time, the ruling remains true to the original intent of the RPA by
ensuring that manufacturers keep their resellers on equal footing when
competing for the same sale.82 Most importantly, the Court's emphatic
language establishing inter-brand competition as the primary concern of
the RPA portends the end of the Morton Salt inference. 3 By retiring the
Morton Salt rule, the instant Court has finally aligned the RPA with the
policy goals of the nation's other antitrust legislation."

78. See id. (noting that price discrimination between two purchasers must be of such
magnitude as to substantially affect competition between competitors).
79. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
80. See supranotes 55-64 and accompanying text.
81. See Volvo Trucks, 126 S. Ct. at 872.
82. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
83. See Volvo Trucks, 126 S. Ct. at 872-73.
84. See Larue, supra note 73, at 1920 (asserting that elimination of the Morton Salt rule in
favor of a market analysis approach would harmonize the RPA with other antitrust laws).
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